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ABSTRACT 
A survey of recent Christian literature on the dialogue with Bud-
dhism reveals a conversation which is new in both spirit and content 
This article summarizes these new directions in five areas: (1) the 
methodology of dialogue; (2) the nature of the Ultimate and of reli-
gious language; (3) religious experience as an experience of selfless-
ness; (4) tibe value and need of acting in the world, and (5) the unique, 
salvifíc mediation of Jesus and Gautama. In each of these areas, 
suggestions are offered as to how the new insights from the dialogue 
with Buddhism might aid in clarifying questions and incoherencies 
in present-day Christian doctrine and practice. 
There is something different, something new in Christianity's 
dialogue with Buddhism over the past decade. Most of the works sur-
veyed in this paper (see Bibliography) indicate a notable shift from the 
earlier "let's see the differences so we can establish the superiority" 
attitude to an approach which wants to take differences seriously, un-
derstand them correctly, in order to learn from them. The following 
pages will try to describe what this new attitude is discovering. After 
some preliminary considerations of the new attitude's methodology, I 
will highlight—much more is not possible—"converging insights" in 
four major areas of the Christian conversation with Buddhists. In each 
area I will also add my own reflections on how these new insights might 
be pursued in order to "correct" certain ambiguities in present-day 
Christian doctrine and practice. 
I. A Different Method for Dialogue 
Much to Learn and a Need to Learn It 
While all of the works surveyed in this study evince a genuine 
respect for Buddhism and are a clear move beyond the "poor pagan" 
mentality, a few of the authors still stand on the same platform that 
sustained earlier, apologetic studies of Buddhism: they argue that Chris-
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tianity and Buddhism represent two totally opposed, absolutely un-
bridgeable religious views, or that the basic claims of Buddha, when 
compared to those of Christ, are radically inadequate (Callaway, Hoss-
feld, Aldwinckle). But these are the exceptions. The majority of the 
authors approach the conversation with Buddhists with a firm convic-
tion that there is much for Christians to learn and, given the crisis of 
Western Christianity, an urgent need to learn it. A frequent image is that 
of "the covenant with the East": as the Fathers recognized a "covenant 
with the Greeks" from which Christianity could (and certainly did!) 
learn, today the same transformative encounter can take place with the 
East (Johnston, 1970, xiv; Gilkey, 2; Merton, 1975, 313). 
For the conversation, however, to be fruitful, it must have as its 
starting point a deep commitment to Christ and to the truth discovered in 
him. Yet the depth of this commitment must be matched by the breadth 
of one's openness to the truth that may be contained in Buddha's mes-
sage. Such openness is called for not only as an evident prerequisite for 
authentic dialogue but also as a demand of the Christian claim that God's 
love and revelatory presence are universal (Drummond, 207; Swearer, 
49; Waldenfels, 206-07). 
But in this dialogue, all the authors insist, the evident differences 
between Buddha and Christ must not be slighted; only if they are taken 
seriously can anything be learned. There are recurrent warnings against 
a facile syncretism which reduces all religions to a common de-
nominator or against a simplistic arationalism which wants to cut away 
all doctrines in order to inhale a "common essence" (Merton, 1968,43; 
Johnston, 1978, 43; Rupp, 3-26). Yet though it is admitted that these 
differences can sometimes make for "unbridgeable gaps," the common 
expectation of the authors is that it is especially at the points where 
Buddhism most differs that Christianity has most to learn. Drummond 
speaks of "converging foci" (206-07). This reflects a growing insight in 
the Christian conversation with Buddhism (and with other religions) 
that truth, especially religious truth, is not a matter of either-or but of 
both-and (Kreeft, 514-15; Spae, 1977, 3, 25; deSilva, xii-xiii). Every 
religious assertion must, somehow, be balanced by its opposite. One of 
the most recent and eloquent cases for this "both-and" quality of reli-
gious experience and doctrine is John A. T. Robinson's Truth is Two-
Eyed. 
The Experiential-Praxis Basis for Dialogue 
Another new insight into the method for dialoguing with Bud-
dhism is the growing recognition that the partners must somehow "pass 
over," i.e., personally enter into the experience of the other religion. 
Dialogue must, to some extent at least, be based on a praxis of the other 
religion (J. Dunne, ix-xiii). This is particularly called for in the dialogue 
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with Buddhism. To a great extent, Christians have misunderstood and 
therefore misused Buddhist language. Language, as found in Theravada 
and Mahayana texts and in Zen literature, is not meant primarily to 
provide "explanation" but "experience" (Merton, 1968, 36-38; 
Johnston, 1970, 173). "Buddhist terminology.. . is largely 
phenomenological and descriptive and it aims to portray an experience 
rather than a reality. It is not metaphysical but soteriological, and if we 
interpret it ontologically, Buddhism appears atheistic, monistic, or 
pantheistic" (Gardini, 34-35). 
Merton articulates a growing consensus when he suggests that 
therefore the conversation with Buddhists must first be a communion 
before it is a communication. It is a communion which originates in 
one's own religion and which is based on "the science of an ultimate 
experience." It enables Christians "to penetrate the ultimate ground of 
their beliefs" and allows them to touch the ultimate ground of Buddhist 
beliefs. Such communion, while it still recognizes "the very important 
essential differences" between Christianity and Buddhism, unveils the 
possibility that both "in their inner reality... end up with the simplest 
and most baffling thing of all: direct confrontation with Absolute Being, 
Absolute Love, Absolute Mercy or Absolute Void..." (Merton, 1968, 
61-62; id., 1975, 310-12; Johnston, 1978, 77-78, 85-86; Swearer, 113-15; 
Dubarle, 71). 
While this communion is "beyond the level of words," it can enable 
Christians to "find a common ground of verbal understanding" (Merton, 
1975, 315). Here we have a handle on the immense problem of language 
in the Christian-Buddhist conversation. Both traditions have developed 
in isolation from each other and therefore have "no common language." 
Yet with the experiential starting point of "coimnunion" we can attempt 
a new method of dialogue: "... dialogue is that form of communication 
in which the means of communication has to be created in the course of 
the process of communication itself" (Sangharakshita, 58, also 59-63). 
We can perhaps discover that our "words," with all their baffling differ-
ences, are more complementary than contradictory. Merton therefore 
suggests, "the real area for investigation . . . might after all be theology 
rather than psychology or asceticism." But he adds: "... it must be 
theology as experienced in Christian contemplation, not the speculative 
theology of textbooks and disputations" (1968, 58). 
A further guideline in the new dialogue bears mention, even though 
it is not found as an explicit point of consensus among the authors. 
Swearer reminds us that the conversation can be bogged down with an 
overconcern for correct interpretation, for historical accuracy, for know-
ing whether the historical Buddha or the historical Jesus really said or 
meant this or that. Such questions, no doubt, are important. But they 
should not distract us from the fact that the dialogue is to be carried out 
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between believers not between beliefs. It concerns not the ipsissima 
verba or the verissima facta of Buddha or Jesus but the way these two 
archetypal figures have been understood and followed throughout his-
tory and especially in our present day (Swearer, 16). 
II. God and God-Talk 
Convening Insights 
1. Buddha was not an atheist; There is a clear consensus among 
most of the authors that to label Buddha an atheist or to declare that 
Nirvana or Sunyata are utterly godless is, as stated above, to abuse 
Buddha's language—or lack of language (deSilva, 67-74). Buddha is 
recognized as a religious practitioner who, as the parable of the poison 
arrow attests, wanted to resolve a practical problem not propose a new 
religious theory (Drummond, 73,115); as Marx might put it, his primary 
concern was to transform the subject not to understand it. And because 
he realized that all words and theories are both inadequate and distrac-
tive, he refused to speak of God or Brahman/Atman. We should respect 
his silence, not fill it with our hasty interpretations (Johnston, 1970,173; 
id., 1978, 107-12; Merton, 1968, 81; Spae, 1977, 19). 
Yet many of the authors cautiously—sometimes not so 
cautiously—suggest that if we enter into the words that are used in the 
Buddhist scriptures and especially if we regard the practice of contem-
porary Buddhists, we will recognize that the Buddhist experience of 
Nirvana, Sunyata, Satori is not unrelated to the Christian experience of 
God (deSilva, 138-45). Drummond states that after considering "... the 
range of Buddha's teaching on Nirvana, I feel compelled to affirm that in 
some authentic way he was in contactwith aspects or dimensions of the 
Reality that Jesus terms the kingdom of God" (127). Dumoulin sees in 
Nirvana a genuine recognition of "Transcendence" (1974, 97-98). 
Johnston, witnessing the sense of participation, affirmation, and "pure 
dependence" experienced in Satori, holds that we are dealing with an 
experience ".. . upon which (for the Christian) it is impossible to put any 
name except that of God" (1970,125). Buddhist Emptiness, therefore, is 
a "rich emptiness" (Johnston, 1970, 33), which may be a more accurate 
way of describing the Christian experience of the pleroma or fullness of 
God (Merton, 1968, 85; Panikkar, 1978). Sunyata, Vos suggests, can be 
translated "relativity," an attempt to describe the essential interrelated-
ness of all reality in a larger Whole (33). * Whatever the propriety of such 
1
 John Cobb, from his process perspective, diverges somewhat from the general direc-
tion of Christian interpretations of Sunyata. Comparing it with God, he speaks about "two 
absolutes" which complement each other. Sunyata expresses our essential inter-
relatedness, our unity in dependent co-origination (analogous to Whitehead's understand-
ing of "Creativity"), while God is the guiding "principle of lightness" which "participates 
in every instance of dependent co-origination" (11-12). 
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Christian interpretations, they express the willingness to affirm, and 
learn from, Buddhist experience and language of the Ultimate. 
2. The immanence, non-duality, and suprapereonality of the Ulti-
mate: While some authors express concern that Buddhist language 
often seems to dissolve any possible distinction between the Ultimate 
and the finite(Johnston, 1970,41,83-83; Fox, 10), the clear consensus is 
that to brand Buddhism as inescapably monistic is a rash judgment.2 The 
Buddhist challenges the Christian to embrace the logically more frustrat-
ing but personally more rewarding experience of the unity and diversity 
of the Ultimate and the finite, of Nirvana and Samsara. While Sunyata 
truly is every finite reality, while each particular entity truly is (and is 
not just "a piece o f ) Sunyata, still "particularity really exists"; Sunyata 
is what it is, the Absolute, in every particular, so that we have "an 
interpénétration of Absolutes" and still only one Absolute (Fox, 48-50; 
Dumoulin, 1979b, 102-14). 
This is mind-boggling indeed and therefore an invitation to Chris-
tians to stretch their minds towards a fuller appreciation of the imma-
nence of God. As modern theologians recently and mystics through the 
centuries have reminded us, Christians have missed this immanent God 
because of their unbalanced insistence on His Otherness and Transcen-
dence (Johnston, 1970,179). In Buddhism we can detect the immanent 
God of the Johannine writings which, in defining God as love, portray 
him not as a doer but as the doing (in us) of something, a God whose 
"reality . . . is not to be sought beyond the phenomenal" (Bruns, 30-33, 
46, 89). Here is the God who cannot be localized, put in α place, either 
above the clouds or in our hearts (Johnston, 1971,24). Here is a God truly 
encompassing, neither in us nor outside of us; but we and the world in 
Him (Kreeft, 521-22). 
To experience, with the Buddhist, the immanence of the Absolute is 
to discover—or rediscover—that the relation between God and world-
humanity is not monistic (simple identity) or dualistic (clear distinction) 
but non-dualistic. A number of the authors suggest that any experience 
of God which has not yet felt this non-duality is incomplete or immature. 
The Cartesian "cogito," with its radical subject-object distinction, may 
be a profitable starting point for the natural sciences, but it constitutes a 
"false start" for our understanding of the Ultimate. Instead of beginning 
with distinctions, we can and should start with the original unity be­
tween the Ultimate and the finite—a unity which is available, Buddhists 
tell us, in a non-reflexive awareness which can best be described as 
"consciousness itself" or "pure consciousness" (Kreeft, 525; Merton, 
2
 Again, Callaway strongly disagrees with this consensus; he is certain that Zen is 
nothing but "Idealistic Monism" (see 162-65; 232-33). In all the other areas of "converging 
insights" which are still to be considered in this study, Callaway stands in stark disagree-
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1968, 23-24). In this consciousness, which is given with our very being, 
God is known neither as an objective reality nor simply as a subjective 
experience. God is known to be radically beyond our distinctions be-
tween subject and object. Therefore, when Christians speak of God as an 
objective other, they must remind themselves that they are speaking 
only quoad nos and not quoad the reality of God; and when Buddhists 
maintain that the Absolute is our subjective consciousness, they too 
must be reminded that they are speaking adverbally not adjectivally, i.e., 
they are describing how they experience the Absolute, not what the 
Absolute is (Kreeft, 525). A true religious experience is the experience of 
God being subjective in us; it is to touch the "Single Center of all beings," 
the "still point of the turning world," the ipsum esse subsisting in us and 
we in it; it is an experience in which it is impossible neatly to locate our 
selves or the Self of God. The Ultimate and the finite, then, are not "one"; 
yet neither are they "two"; they make up a non-dual Reality in which 
both are and have their being in each other (Kreeft, 526-27; Merton, 1968, 
9-13, 23-24, 71-73). 
But does such a conversation with Buddhism still allow for a per-
sonal God? Reservations are voiced that the Buddhist perception of the 
non-duality between the Ultimate and the finite, while establishing a 
splendid vision of unity, easily renders meaningless any talk of personal 
community among humans or with God (Fox, 180-83). Yet there are 
converging insights among the authors that the experience of Nirvana is 
not utterly devoid of personal qualities. Drummond finds a basis for this 
in the frequent references in Buddhist texts to Nirvana or the Dharma as 
"the Loverly" (124,193). C. Dünner and Merton go further. They claim 
that the Buddhist experience of Enlightenment is not contradictory to 
but can include the experience of "Being (which) has fallen in love with 
beings" so that a "secret name" of Being might well be "Father" 
(C. Dunne, 51-56, 39-41). Buddhist praxis indicates that to realize Nir-
vana as Absolute Reality is to experience it as "Absolute Love": "Pure 
Being is Infinite Compassion . . . Absolute Emptiness is Absolute Com-
passion" (Merton, 1968, 84-87; Johnston, 1978, 67-68). 
The majority of the authors, however, want to qualify such personal 
language. They accept the Buddhist admonition that much of Chris-
tianity's personal theism has limited and "offended" the Ultimate. God 
understood as Thou, for all its merits, has led to an anthropomorphized 
Deity, a totally-Other, who controls our lives or who can be used by 
humans to control their fellows. Buddhists therefore underscore the 
reminder of Ratzinger that "the personal dimension of God infinitely 
transcends human personhood, so that the concept of person, as much as 
it is illuminating, still proves to be an inadequate similitude" (in 
Dumoulin, 1974,168). Our authors clumsily search for a more adequate 
language: God is personal but not a personality (Bruns, 45); God is 
46 HORIZONS 
"pre-personal" (Dumoulin, 1974,164), an "unpersonal personal" (Wai-
denfels, 181-82), "supra-personal." Better to admit that personal lan-
guage of God is essentially inadequate, that God is both personal and 
impersonal (Robinson, 13-40). Only when one has felt and recognized 
this non-dual, more than personal quality of the Ultimate, can one 
fittingly address it as Thou (Lassalle, 68). 
3. The Non-Being of God: Gilkey describes his reaction when, for 
the first time, a Buddhist (Masao Abe) asked him why Christian theology 
begins with being rather than nonbeing. It "blew my mind," he admits; 
and it led him to suggest that this focus on divine nonbeing might more 
deeply and coherently reveal the Christian God than has traditional 
"being-centered" Western theology (Gilkey, 2-3; Spae, 1979, 39-40; 
Johnston, 1978,115-25). God's reality and activity transcend and there-
fore include both being and nonbeing. Christian theologians have 
missed this. "God is being qualified dialectically and yet essentially by 
nonbeing, and so his mystery transcends the categories of both being and 
nonbeing. It is in this dialectical pattern . . . that he manifests himself in 
all his works; and it is on this pattern alone that the self can find 
itself—by losing itself" (Gilkey, 10). Creation is possible only if God's 
being is "emptied," i.e., limited by nonbeing (Dumoulin, 1974,180-82; 
id., 1979b, 144-53; Gilkey, 10-11; Waldenfels, 191-93). This transcend-
ing dialectic is contained even more clearly in the deepest implications 
of the Christian understanding of incarnation and the cross in which 
Deity realizes itself in "letting-go," in embracing Nothingness (Swearer, 
109-11). Reality, God's and ours, unfolds only in this constant movement 
into and embrace of what is not Itself (Waldenfels, 178,197-207; Gilkey, 
11). 
A Corrective for Christian Doctrinalism and Dualism 
1. One of the aspects in Christian consciousness, both past and 
present, which stands in urgent need of a "Buddhist balance" is what 
might be termed "doctrinalism." Simply stated: Christianity seems to 
have taken its words and concepts, whether biblical or papal, much too 
seriously. This obsessive insistence on right words or doctrines (or-
thodoxy) blurs the fact that all religion originates from a deeply personal 
experience and not from an affirmation of propositions (Merton, 1968, 
39-41, 56). Orthodoxy provides a clear and distinct concept of God 
which too easily becomes Freud's transcendent crutch for our insecurity 
and anxiety (Fernando, 1979, 93). And the security of right knowing 
debilitates so readily the primacy of right acting. 
Our Buddhist brothers and sisters remind us of what our mystics all 
along and our theologians in their better moments have admitted: that to 
experience and to know God is to encounter das Geheimnis 
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schlechthin—absolute mystery! This is mystery which, as much as we 
are grasped by it and dare to speak of it, will always remain beyond our 
words and dogmas. Theology, therefore, if it is to be true to its task, must 
ultimately and always be a reductio in mysterium (Waldenfels, 186-89). 
And Christians, while they must "cling to God," need not and ought not 
to "cling to views and ideas about God" (Johnston, 1970,190; Lassalle, 
79-93). 
Yet Christians will remind their Buddhist partners that words/doc-
trines are important, even necessary. In stressing the emptiness of words 
and the limitations of the intellect, Buddhists run the risk of not being 
able to "say anything about anything" (Johnston, 1970,92; id., 1978,43; 
Waldenfels, 159-76). If Christianity is the Body of Christ and the People 
of God, it needs some kind of a "common language" (Merton, 1968,47). 
And because it claims the incarnational immanence of God in the world, 
it will not look on the forms or symbols of God in the world as meaning-
less illusions; while the faceless mystery of God cannot be contained in 
any one human face, it can be reflected in many faces (C. Dunne, 75-82). 
But in making such affirmations, Christians remain in need of the bal-
ance of Buddhist negation: as much as Christians affirm their words and 
doctrines, they must be ready to negate them; they can proclaim the 
value and even necessity of doctrine only if with equal insistence they 
recognize its inadequacy. Buddha might use a paradox here: words 
about God can be valid and useful only if they flow from a profound 
experience of silence. Behind and within all Christian doctrine there 
must be "... a silence which prepares the way for the word and the 
silence which is the word's highest utterance" (C. Dunne, 23; Panikkar, 
1971, 84-89; Steindl-Rast, 175-79). 
2. The Christian encounter with Buddha's understanding of the 
Ultimate can also be, I suggest, an invaluable aid in addressing another 
area of incoherence in Christian proclamation: dualism. Christianity, to 
be sure, proclaims itself as a "this-worldly" religion. More than any 
other of the world religions, it claims that it is best able to affirm and 
guide the "basic faith" of secularity in the ultimate value of this world 
and human involvement in it. And indeed, the central symbols of Chris-
tianity—kingdom, incarnation, resurrection—are this-worldly and 
non-dualistic in that they affirm a God intimately involved in history 
and working with human action. Yet despite the non-dualistic content of 
these symbols, despite the rallying calls of theologians to affirm this 
world, many Christians—and this includes theologians—remain 
"anonymous dualists." The reason for this is that they continue to 
interpret their non-dualistic symbols in a basically dualistic philosophi-
cal framework—usually traced back to Neo-Platonism. 
Dualism, sometimes anonymously and sometimes quite con-
sciously, infects and debilitates Christian affirmation of the humanum 
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and mundanum (Rupp, 38, 69). How can the dualistic "God of theism" 
be truly immanent in history when He is perfect unto himself, in need of 
no other, immutable and related to the world rationis tantum? How can 
life in this world truly prepare for and be part of the future Kingdom 
when, as even many theologians of hope insist, that Kingdom will arrive 
as an other-worldly "coming," not as a this-worldly "becoming," a 
"mighty act of God" carried out not because of but despite the actions of 
humans. The eternal significance of human action is thus jeopardized by 
the sovereignty of God's grace; at the most, human activity is meaningful 
only as an "admission ticket" to or a "proleptic sign" of another divine 
order.3 How can we take the "supernatural existential," the non-dual 
relation of nature and grace seriously when, in the final analysis ("dou-
ble gratuity!" nothing in us or in God requires the bestowal of grace? 
Many Christian thinkers, liberation and especially process theolo-
gians, are attempting to root out this prevailing Christian dualism. Some 
of the converging insights in the new dialogue with Buddhists can be of 
vital help in enabling them to coherently explain what the symbols of 
incarnation and resurrection really imply. The Buddhist experience of 
the supra-personal immanence of the Absolute in the finite can confirm 
and perhaps refine the process notion of panentheism: God will not be 
seen so much as a Super-Being relating to finite beings but as the unitive 
Mystery which lives and moves and has its being within finite beings, as 
they have their being in It. And the paradoxical non-duality which 
Mahayana Buddhism claims to be the relation between Nirvana and 
Samsara will enable the Rahnerians to carry through with their notion 
of the supernatural existential and admit that "nature" cannot be with-
out "grace," nor "grace" without "nature." A non-dualistic notion of 
God-world will also lend coherence to the claims of the liberation 
theologians, for if God is subjective in us, he cannot carry out his 
liberating action without us (nor we without him) so that our actions are 
his and the Kingdom we build here on earth is His Reality. The new 
conversation with Buddhism, then, would seem to enable Christians to 
become more fully and actively aware of the Non-Duality which is 
inherent, but often blurred, in the Christian vision. 
III. The Selfless Self 
Converging Insights 
1. A Misunderstanding: The consensus of authors examined for 
this study are in basic agreement with Merton's assessment that most 
3For a further unveiling of the dualism that hides behind the eschatology of theolo-
gians of hope like Moltmann and Pannenberg, see: Langdon Gilkey, Heaping the 
Whirlwind (New York: Seabury, 1976), pp. 226-38; Jose Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology 
m a Revolutionary Situation (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), pp. 138-50. 
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Christian discussions about the Buddhist view of Anatta/No-self have 
been, like the discussions about Nirvana, "completely equivocal" (Mer-
ton, 1968,118; Swearer, 75; Drummond, 138-40). Again, the blame can 
be pinned on an abuse of Buddhist language. In his talk about being a 
No-self, Buddha was not proposing a metaphysical doctrine but an 
ethical invitation; he was not arguing an "eternalist" or an "an-
nihilationist,, concept of the soul but urging a radically different way of 
experiencing ourselves and the selves ofothers (Swearer, 179-80; de-
Silva, 30-32). The problem is that Christians have understood that lan-
guage much too literally; or they have taken their own language about 
the "new self" or about the "self in Christ" so literally and simplistically 
that they are blind to the possible complementarity between the No-Self 
and the New Self (Merton, 1968, 118). In fact, some would argue that 
Anatta is a via negationis and the New-self a via affirmationis, both 
trying to draw us, along quite different paths, to the same amazing 
discovery: that the human self can be so transformed, in consciousness 
and in way of acting, that it no longer resembles the self it thought it was. 
It is so new as not to be the original self (C. Dunne, 65-67; Swearer, 80; 
Drummond, 142, 147; Merton, 1968, 76-77; Kreeft, 520). 
2. The Meaning of Anatta: Recognizing past misunderstandings 
of Anatta, our authors move on, in surprising agreement, to try to grasp 
what the Buddhist No-self really implies. They recognize that Buddhism 
provides Christians with an opportunity to know and experience that the 
true reality of the person does not consist in being an Individuum, a 
given entity; rather, the true self is radically, essentially, constantly in 
relation to other selves and to all reality; its "being" is constantly one of 
ongoing "dependent co-origination"; its being is relating. Therefore, the 
true self is a selfless self, constantly losing-finding its self in its relations 
with others (deSilva, 90-103; C. Dunne, 16-17). Many of the authors use 
the psychology of Jung to explain and confirm this. It is possible to break 
through our ego-consciousness and experience a consciousness in 
which there is no ego, in which we are aware of ourselves-at-one with 
reality around us, vitally related (Johnston, 1970, 54; Drummond, 146-
48,195; Merton, 1968,64; Franck, 77). In T. S. Eliot's terms, "you are the 
music" (Johnston, 1970, 23). According to Aquinas, intellectus est 
quodamodo omnia—our selves, in a sense, are all things (Johnston, 
1968, 55). 
3. The Self-in-God: Converging insights among our authors point 
out that the Buddhist Anatta doctrine can aid Christians in more fully 
appropriating the content of such expressions as to be "in Christ," 
"united with God," "a temple of the Spirit," or of the text (cited by 
almost all the authors), "I live, not yet I, but Christ lives in me" (Gal. 
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2:20). Having "passed over" to Buddha's experience of Anatta, Chris-
tians can realize that such language means more than an ethical imita-
tion of Christ, more than being filled with God as a glass might be filled 
with water. Rather, Buddhists suggest that these Christian claims are 
inviting us to a non-dual experience of Christ/God (Swearer, 82-83; 
Merton, 1968, 118-20; Johnston, 1970, 75-76; Drummond, 151-52). It is 
an experience in which we become aware of the claim of the mystics that 
"the soul is God" (Johnston, 1970,75); or, phrased more cautiously, "... 
that God is (among other things) my true identity" (Kreeft, 521). In 
arriving at the depths of our consciousness we discover that there is no 
self-consciousness ; rather, we are conscious of ourselves with the con-
sciousness of God; we truly participate "in the mind of Christ" (Phil. 
2,5). This experience is not only one of immense peace in that it affirms 
the value of our divine being; but also, in it we find ourselves operating 
out of a new principium, a new center which is no longer the self-
concerned, ratiocinating ego. We no longer find ourselves "obeying" 
God's law, but simply being and carrying out our true identity: a No-self 
at one with God and others (Swearer, 82-83; Franck, 134). 
4. The Fall: A number of the authors find that the Buddhist under-
standing of Anatta provides needed clarification for the Christian no-
tion of Sin and the Fall. In the light of our true nature as No-selves, our 
sinfulness is not seen as a corruption of human nature due to some past 
event; "original sin" is not an ontological separation from God. Rather, 
the root cause and essence of our sinfulness is ignorance—the pseudo-
knowledge acquired from eating of the Tree of Knowledge which leads 
us to think that we are individuals and that the purpose of existence is to 
maintain and augment that individuality (Franck, 97). Sin stems from a 
false self-consciousness which makes the self aware of what is good or 
evil for itself (Merton, 1968,127). The Fall, therefore, is the prevailing 
disposition of humans—fostered through generations of collective bad 
karma—"to treat the ego as objects of desire or of repulsion" (Merton, 
1968, 82-83; Fox, 60; Drummond, 101-02; Dumoulin, 1979a, 22-26). 
A Corrective for Christian Individualism 
Perhaps the most valuable lesson which Christianity can learn from 
these converging insights concerning the Anatta-doctrine is to recog-
nize the individualism which has infected the church's all too Western 
interpretation of the Gospel. In our present state of world affairs, this 
lesson appears more urgent than ever. The undialectical affirmation of 
the self and of being which animates so much of Western politics, 
economics, philosophy, and theology, "maybe," in Gilkey's words, "the 
principle of world destruction" (8). The inability to see the value of 
non-being and of the No-self, the insistence that the welfare and growth 
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of the individual self or the national self cannot be jeopardized has led to 
the domination and exploitation of other selves and of nature, making 
earth an endangered planet. How much has the church bought into and 
even fostered this insidious sacrality of the self? The new conversation 
with Buddhism is suggesting to Christians that they will not be able to 
make a meaningful contribution to "a new world order" unless they and 
their theologians (even process theologians!) rid themselves of the ves-
tiges of Western Substantialist and existentialist philosophy and its 
overemphasis on the ultimate value and inviolability of the individual. 
It must be stressed that to learn from the Buddhist No-self is not 
simply a matter of Christians affirming more clearly what they already 
know. It will lead to a radical revision of Christian attitudes. It will help 
bring about what John Cobb feels is a much needed "postpersonal form 
of Christian existence, in which Western Christianity is finally able to 
free itself from its attachment to individualized personal existence as a 
final good" and in which "interpersonal (and international) relations 
can be understood in a different way."4 
It is only this post-personal form of Christian existence, which 
understands the True Self as the Selfless Self, that will enable Chris-
tianity, together with Buddhism, to further the "quantum leap" which 
humanity today must make if its evolution is to continue: the evolution-
ary leap from individuality to communality, from a world of divided, 
warring tribes to a "global village" (Franck, 86-87). Only if human 
beings cease understanding themselves as individuals, only if they 
profoundly realize that to be themselves they must be part of others— 
only then will they be able to form authentic community, whether in the 
church or among nations; only then will they be able to get beyond the 
patriotism and nationalism that continue to hamstring efforts for global 
community (deSilva, 146-59; Fox, 71). 
IV. Value of This World and of Action in It 
Converging Insights 
1. Buddhism not world-denying: While many of the authors rec-
ognize the potential for Buddhism, especially when understood monis-
torically, to be a "cop-out" on history (Rupp, 51, 54; Dhavamony, 53), 
they voice a practically unanimous opinion that Buddhism is not essen-
tially a world-denying religion. To judge it so is to fall prey to Western 
scholars' all too simplistic dichotomy between the mystical, passive 
religions of the East and the prophetic, active religions of the West 
(Johnston, 1978, 10). Many authors call for recognition of the fact that 
today Buddhism is just as intent and just as successful as is Christianity 
in adjusting to the world-affirming faith of contemporary men and 
4Christ in a Pluralistic Age (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975), pp. 220, 212. 
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women (Dumoulin, 1974, 150-58; id., 1979a, 29; Spae, 1977, 22). In 
doing this, Buddhism is returning (like Christianity) to its early sources 
and proving its "original universal character" which is "essentially 
humanistic" (Dumoulin, 1974, 61; id., 1979b, 84-87). 
The authors agree that from what we can know of the original 
message of Gautama, the First Noble Truth does not imply a condemna-
tion of the finite world and life in it. Rather, the First Truth reveals that, 
since all finite reality is in constant "dependent co-origination," every-
thing is a "no-thing" and must not be made absolute. To make anything 
in the world ultimate and to hold on to it with all one's being is to grasp at 
an ultimately disappointing idol (Drummond, 186-88; Swearer, 62-68; 
Kreeft, 527). Realizing this, one can "sit loose in the saddle" as one 
moves on to an active involvement in the world (Drummond, 107-09). 
Therefore Buddha, like Jesus proposed a revolutionarily new view of 
society without being a social reformer. While he could accept the favors 
of kings and rajas, Gautama demonstrated a dangerous "freedom from 
any concept of the sacral king" (Drummond, 198). And even though he 
did not call for the abolition of the caste system (as Paul did not reject 
Slavery), his Anatta doctrine and his acceptance of all men (and later 
women) into the Sangha constituted "a radical rejection of both princi-
ple and practice of caste" (Drummond, 198, 48, 63-67; Rupp, 64-68). 
Drummond argues that many, if not all, of the world-denying attitudes 
found in Theravada literature do not stem from the Buddha but are most 
likely "the result of later developments in Buddhist monastic com-
munities"; he compares such attitudes with similar world-denying de-
velopments in early Christianity, even in St. Paul (Drummond, 150,100). 
2. Are history and evil real? It is not easy to focus a clear consen-
sus among the authors concerning their interpretations of Buddhism's 
response to this question. As we have seen, Gautama's original message 
and especially its Mahayanist interpretation contain a recognition of the 
need to act in the world. But many of our authors point out that it is 
difficult for Buddhists to coherently ground this need to act in a recogni-
tion that time and process are real, that there is the genuine possibility of 
things going wrong and that therefore it is necessary to counteract evil 
and work for a better world (Rupp, 50-52; Merton, 1968,132; Robinson, 
94). There is, then, a general recognition among the authors that in these 
areas of the dialogue, Buddhists perhaps have much to learn from Chris-
tians (Spae, 1977, 23). 
But the warning is voiced that it is too simplistic to brand the 
Buddhist experience of time as cyclic. Given the central Buddhist affir-
mation that bad karma can be overcome and that there is a process of 
rebirths, one might better speak of an upward spiral movement or time 
within Samsara (Spae, 1977, 4; Dumoulin, 1979b, 119-24). But more 
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importantly, it is recognized that the Buddhist insistence that the full­
ness of Reality is to be experienced in the Now is not totally opposed to 
the Christian insistence on history. In fact, the Buddhist Now is a needed 
balance for Christianity's exaggerated concern with the historical which 
tends to place "salvation" primarily in a fact of the past and leads to a 
fundamentalistic "absolutizing [of] the relativities of history" (Robin­
son, 54-55). Also, Christianity's preoccupation with the future tends to 
blur the fact that while Jesus proclaimed the Kingdom to come, he also, 
paradoxically, announced that it is now (Merton, 1968, 138). 
Concerning the reality of evil, many of the authors remind us that it 
is again an abuse of Buddhist language simply to conclude that if evil is 
described as an "illusion" it is therefore not real. For Buddhism, there is 
no dualistic distinction between the subjective and the objective orders, 
between the ordo cognoscendi and the ordo essendi. Therefore, " . . . a 
change (or a lack) in consciousness is also a change (or lack) in the real" 
(Rupp, 38). This is corroborated if we take seriously Socrates' and New­
man's equation between true knowledge and true virtue; what we truly 
know (Newman's "real assent") or do not know really affects and is what 
we are or are not (Kreeft, 528). If all this is then understood within the 
framework of the Buddhist experience of Reality-as-Now, we can hap­
pily recognize that while we must strain all efforts to overcome the 
present real evil of ignorance, ultimately all evil and all ignorance is not 
real; every instance of evil is a "felix culpa9' (Kreeft, 535). In Buddhist 
terms, all ignorance is contained and overcome in the fullness and the 
dynamic interrelatedness of Nirvana; in complementary Christian 
terms, all evil can and will be an occasion for good and for greater unity, 
i.e., an occasion by which the Kingdom-to-be is realized as the King-
dom-now. Ultimately, evil is an illusion. "Death, where is thy sting?" 
(1 Cor. 15:55). 
3. The natural need to act in the world: These converging insights 
as to the "illusion" of history and evil are confirmed by further insights 
among our authors concerning the Buddhist (especially Mahayanist) 
non-dual distinction between prajna/bodhi (wisdom) and Καηιηα (com­
passion). To be swept away by wisdom into the quiet sea of Sunyata is 
also to be swept up into the dynamic stream of compassion for all beings. 
It is impossible truly to be wise without actively being compassionate. 
Some of the authors mention the frequent Christian claim that karuna is 
not the same as agape since it does not really admit of any "other" to 
love; but they go on to point out that while this may be true in theory, 
there is no difference between the Buddhist practice of compassion and 
the Christian practice of charity. Evidently, such theory is missing 
something (Dumoulin, 1974, 119-20; Kreeft, 534). As to the further 
Christian claim that karuna aims at bringing others to enlightenment, 
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while agape is intent on changing both the person and society, Fox 
responds that compassion "will do whatever it must to awaken men to 
wisdom"; and that includes the relief of poverty, the abolition of oppres-
sion, the establishment of a just social-political order (62-66). For the 
Buddhist, the fundamental motivation for such efforts towards social 
change is not the intrinsic superiority of one social-economic order over 
another but the desire that all men and women experience enlighten-
ment and know the relativity of all individuals and theories. Fox, how-
ever, adds that in regard to the relative adequacy of any one social 
system, Buddhism shows a greater affinity for socialism than for 
capitalism (74-79). 
A Corrective for Christian Activism 
Thanks to liberation/political theologians, Christians today are be-
coming more aware that Christian life in the recent past has been exces-
sively a matter of "individual piety," that today they are called to act in 
the world, that liberating praxis is of the essence of the Gospel. In order 
to carry out this urgent program of liberation and to avoid certain 
excesses of their own, liberation theologians can learn much from the 
new dialogue with Buddhism. Their Buddhist brothers and sisters offer 
them two crucially important insights into why praxis so easily becomes 
activism, or, why there can be no effective liberation without spiritual-
ity. 
First, the new conversation with Buddhism, as described in this 
section, tells the liberation theologian that it is not sufficient that libera-
tion praxis be based on careful social analysis and on a concrete political 
program; it must also be grounded in the individual's contemplative or 
mystical experience of his/her and the world's nondual relation with 
God. Praxis must be fruitfully wedded not only to theoria but also to 
sophia. Base Communities must foster not only a social "raising of 
consciousness" (concienciamento) but also a mystical "deepening of 
consciousness." Buddhists would offer a number of reasons for this. 
— Only if our praxis is rooted in and sustained by the profound 
nirvanic realization that our actions are God's, that they are not just our 
feeble efforts but part of a larger, indefatigable divine process—only then 
will we truly know what we are doing; only then will we continue doing 
it in face of the crucifying opposition that all social liberation confronts. 
Without such mystical grounding, our acts become activism: isolated, 
scattered, frantic, mindless (Merton, 1975, 349). 
— Also, while Buddhists will learn from the liberation theologian 
that sin is systemic, part of social structures, they will also remind the 
liberationist that the root problem is not social structures but human 
consciousness. Yes, sin does infect the body politic, and the body may be 
so infected that immediate, even revolutionary surgery is needed. Yet 
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the Buddhist warns that the infecting bacteria is human ignorance, a 
false consciousness which, because it believes in individual egos, 
creates a false picture of society. Only if this bacteria, this false con-
sciousness is destroyed can social structures truly be changed. 
— Buddhism therefore clarifies both the means and the ultimate 
goal of liberation praxis. The final end of all social involvement is not to 
fashion a new social order or to dethrone multinational tyrants or to 
remove poverty and hunger (although these certainly are immediate and 
urgent ends); rather, the principal goal of liberation is to bring all men 
and women to personal enlightenment, to a mystical experience of their 
No-selves and essential interrelatedness in the Kingdom. Such en-
lightenment must also be considered part of the necessary means to the 
ultimate end. If it is not, the immediate achievements of social change 
and dethronement of tyrants will be short-lived. 
Second, the new conversation with Buddhism tells liberation 
theologians that if their praxis is not to become activism, it must not only 
be grounded in contemplation; it must also be detached from its own 
action. The Buddhist insistence on detachment and the Christian insis-
tence on involvement must paradoxically and creatively include each 
other. ".. .[T]he mystical centre needs the prophetic centre if it is not to 
become airborne But equally the prophetic centre needs the mystical 
centre if it is not to become arrogant, narrow and unlovely..." (Robin-
son, 64-65). If we are not truly detached from our praxis we all too easily 
consider our action the only way to effect change; we are inclined to 
crush anyone in its way; or we ourselves are crushed when our actions 
do not yield their intended fruits. To be truly free for action and in-
volvement we must be free from it. And this freedom is the fruit of the 
mystical experience by which we know that our feeble actions are part of 
a larger liberation-process, and that while in the moment they are neces-
sary, in an ultimate sense, they are not. We can act without seeking the 
fruits of our actions. The mystical experience of our nonduality with 
God/Kingdom embues us with "the double capacity to be fully and 
effectively invested in what one takes to be morally required activity; 
and yet also to be able to stand back and laugh at oneself" (Rupp, 83). It 
equips a person with "the freedom from concern that goes with being 
simply what he is and accepting things as they are in order to work with 
them as he can" (Merton, 1968,31). The Buddhist insistence on detach-
ment, then, enables liberation theologians to appropriate, in their praxis, 
the full implications of the traditional Christian doctrine that we are 
liberated "by grace" and not by our works in themselves; it enables them 
to grasp the freedom-from-and-for acting contained in the Gospel images 
of being like the birds of the air and the lilies of the field, of not being 
overconcerned with what we shall eat or wear in order to seek first 
the Kingdom of God in the assurance that then all will be added and 
liberation will take place. 
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V. Jesus and Buddha: Mutually Unique 
Converging Insights 
1. Similar missions: The authors who explicitly take up a com-
parison of the "persons and works" of Jesus and Buddha do so, for the 
most part, with caution (Drummond, Amore, C. Dunne, Williams, Hoss-
feld, Dhavamony, Aldwinckle).5 They avoid facile generalizations about 
Jesus and Buddha being two faces of the same God or about one identical 
message in two different languages. Yet these authors do recognize 
certain basic similarities in the missions of the Christ and the Buddha. 
The missions of both consisted basically in revealing something and 
in modeling what was revealed. Buddha, like Jesus, was recognized as 
an authoritative teacher. Both were seen to be preaching an urgently 
important message (the Dharma, the Gospel); and both were acclaimed 
as "speaking with authority"—the authority that comes from having an 
extraordinary experience of what they were talking about (Nirvana, the 
Father) (Drummond, 182-84; Dhavamony, 83-87). Also, both were 
claimed to embody, to model the full reality of their revelation. Thus, 
Buddha was called "he who has arrived" (Tathagata) and Jesus, "he who 
is to come." Or more simply, both were experienced as "Master" or 
"Lord" who carried out their exalted roles not by domineering but by 
showing the way (Dhavamony, 50-52; Nhat Hanh in Berrigan, 107). And 
from what we can cautiously know of the self-awareness of both Masters, 
it seems that Buddha, like Jesus, was animated with a sense of universal 
mission; all peoples must hear the message. Such an awareness of 
personal mission, according to Drummond, "has no parallel in the 
previous history of India" (44, also 80). 
As to the content of what was revealed and modeled, the previous 
three sections of this study indicate the common consensus among our 
authors that the messages of Buddha and Jesus concerning the Ultimate, 
the Self, and the World are clearly different but that the differences are 
ultimately much more complementary than contradictory. Amore crys-
tallizes this complementarity, which he calls "One Message," in Jesus' 
doctrine of "the Pure Mind" found especially in the Gospels of Luke and 
Matthew; the One Message is that of orthopraxis, i.e., the same ethical 
vision (58-95). Williams agrees and throughout his book argues that the 
hub of Jesus' message is the same radical call to destroy the ego and to 
live in interrelating love as is found in Buddha's message (see esp. 27-35; 
48-74). C. Dunne, for all her concern to face squarely the differences 
between Jesus and Buddha, summarizes the attitude of many of our 
authors: "... from a Christian perspective, I see Gotama as a precursor, 
5Jay Williams in his Yeshua Buddha stands as somewhat of an exception to this 
statement. His book presents a thoroughgoing retelling of Jesus' message from the perspec-
tive of Mahayana Buddhism. 
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preparing the way of the Lord. From a Buddhist perspective, I see Jesus 
as a true successor of the Buddha" (10).6 
2. Similar glorification myths: Few of the authors explicitly con-
sider the processes by which Jesus and Gautama were further under-
stood and "glorified" after their deaths. Dhavamony rules out the valid-
ity of any such comparison (52-53). J. Dunne and especially Amore 
would disagree. Dunne makes the theological claim that we can recog-
nize a genuine incarnation of God in all humans (x, 94-95). Amore, 
arguing phenomenologically, shows that especially in the Mahayanist 
school there developed "the nearly complete deification of the Buddha"; 
this process "had a considerable impact on the earlier, more conserva-
tive Buddhist sects as well" (51). Intrinsic to this interpretation is what 
Amore terms "an ancient, legendary pattern" of descent—the Ultimate 
descends to humanity to become part of it. Both Christianity and Bud-
dhism are, according to Amore, incamational religions. He points out 
that while there were forms of Docetism in Buddhism as in early Chris-
tianity, their overriding affirmation is, expressed in Christian terms, that 
God is "embodied" (16, 57). Elsewhere I have argued more extensively 
that both Jesus and Buddha were experienced and interpreted according 
to similar glorification-incarnation myths.7 
A Corrective for Christological Exclusivism 
What has been suggested so far in this section, as well as in this 
entire study, compels Christians to take a new and more critical look at 
the exclusivism that has marked their understanding of the uniqueness 
of Jesus. The new context of religious pluralism, exemplified sharply in 
the new dialogue with Buddhism, forces new questions which urge new 
answers concerning Jesus as "One Mediator" (Robinson, 121). If the 
incarnation and divinity of Jesus can be understood in terms of En-
lightenment, i.e., the personal realization and living of divine-human 
nonduality, if Gautama seems to have experienced just such an En-
lightenment, if the Buddhists are on to something when they claim that 
we should expect "other Buddhas"—then Christians must ask whether 
their traditional claims that Jesus is exclusively unique or even inclu-
sively unique (e.g., in the "anonymous Christianity" model) are accu-
6
 While Aldwinckle admits clear similarities in the missions of Jesus and Buddha as 
well as in the manner in which they were interpreted and "divinized" after their deaths 
(see 211-26), he holds to a definite opposition between their messages. Following the more 
traditional Christian interpretation of Buddhism, he argues that Buddha's Gospel con-
tradicts that of Jesus in three key areas: Buddha could admit of no personal Transcendent, 
he denied the reality of the self, he preached an essentially other-worldly doctrine (227-
35). 
7
"Jesus-Buddha-Krishna: Still Present?" Journal of Ecumenical Studies 16 (1979), 
665-68. 
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rate. This is not to deny the uniqueness of Jesus, but it inquires whether 
we have misunderstood it and the New Testament language about it.8 
Robinson uses a distinction which poses the question incisively: "From 
being totus Christus and totus Deus, the one who is utterly expressive of 
Godhead, through and through, so that in him there is no unChrist-
likeness at all, he becomes totum Christi, totum Dei, the exhaustive 
revelation and all sufficient act, so that apart from him there is nothing of 
God and no Christlikeness at all" (104). To be totus Deus, must Jesus be 
totum Dei? 
In the dialogue with Buddhism, Christians can recognize the possi­
bility that both Jesus and Buddha are mutually unique. Both preserve 
their distinctive difference and importance. And in a sense, both can be 
said to remain absolute in that they present their followers with a salvific 
revelation or Dharma which calls for total commitment and which is 
claimed to be meaningful for all peoples of all times. But this will be an 
absoluteness which is not defined by its ability to exclude or include 
other revelations; rather, Jesus and Buddha will be proven absolute 
insofar as they are able to relate to each other's truths, include and be 
included by each other. Christians, then, can continue to be totally 
committed to Jesus the Christ and to claim that for them God has deci­
sively been revealed in him; but they will also feel not only the possibility 
but the need to "clarify, complete and correct" (Robinson, 125) their 
understanding of Jesus and of God through dialogue with Buddhism as 
well as with other religions.9 
* * * * * * 
This study has tried to show that the new Christian conversation 
with Buddhists is just such a "clarifying, completing and correcting" 
dialogue. In understanding better their Buddhist brothers and sisters, 
Christians have the opportunity to understand better that their God is 
beyond all words and truly immanent in the world, that they themselves 
are radically social beings able to transform society only if they mysti­
cally realize this, and that their Savior is a Christ who defines God but 
does not confine Him. 
8
 For further indications that New Testament language about Christ does not require an 
exclusivistic understanding of his uniqueness, see P. Knitter, "World Religions and the 
Finality of Christ: A Critique of Hans Kung's On Being α Christian," Horizons 5 (1978), 
153-56. 
·Ι have tried to show how such an understanding of Jesus' uniqueness can ground a 
unitive pluralism of religious experience in "Christianity as Religion: A Roman Catholic 
Perspective," in What is Religion? An Enquiry for Christian Theology (Concilium, vol. 
136), ed. David Tracy and Mircea Eliade (New York: Seabury, 1980), pp. 16-19. 
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